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(Greek diabolos; Lat.
diabolus).
The name commonly given to the fallen angels, who are also known as demons (see DEMONOLOGY).
With the article (ho) it denotes Lucifer, their chief, as in Matthew 25:41, "the Devil and his angels".
It may be said of this name, as St. Gregory says of the word angel, "nomen est officii, non naturæ"--the designation of an office, not of a nature.
For the Greek word (from diaballein, "to traduce") means a slanderer, or accuser, and in this sense it is applied to him of whom it is written "the accuser [ho kategoros] of our brethren is cast forth, who accused them before our God day and night" (Apocalypse 12:10).
It thus answers to the Hebrew name Satan which signifies an adversary, or an accuser.
Mention is made of the Devil in many passages of the Old and New Testaments, but there is no full account given in any one place, and the Scripture teaching on this topic can only be ascertained by combining a number of scattered notices from Genesis to Apocalypse, and reading them in the light of patristic and theological tradition.
The authoritative teaching of the Church on this topic is set forth in the decrees of the Fourth Lateran Council (cap.
i, "Firmiter credimus"), wherein, after saying that God in the beginning had created together two creatures, the spiritual and the corporeal, that is to say the angelic and the earthly, and lastly man, who was made of both spirit and body, the council continues:
"Diabolus enim et alii dæmones a Deo quidem naturâ creati sunt boni, sed ipsi per se facti sunt mali."
("the Devil and the other demons were created by God good in their nature but they by themselves have made themselves evil.")
Here it is clearly taught that the Devil and the other demons are spiritual or angelic creatures created by God in a state of innocence, and that they became evil by their own act.
It is added that man sinned by the suggestion of the Devil, and that in the next world the wicked shall suffer perpetual punishment with the Devil.
The doctrine which may thus be set forth in a few words has furnished a fruitful theme for theological speculation for the Fathers and Schoolmen, as well as later theologians, some of whom, Suarez for example, have treated it very fully.
On the other hand it has also been the subject of many heretical or erroneous opinions, some of which owe their origin to pre-Christian systems of demonology.
In later years Rationalist writers have rejected the doctrine altogether, and seek to show that it has been borrowed by Judaism and Christianity from external systems of religion wherein it was a natural development of primitive Animism (q.
v.).
As may be gathered from the language of the Lateran definition, the Devil and the other demons are but a part of the angelic creation, and their natural powers do not differ from those of the angels who remained faithful.
Like the other angels, they are pure spiritual beings without any body, and in their original state they are endowed with supernatural grace and placed in a condition of probation.
It was only by their fall that they became devils.
This was before the sin of our first parents, since this sin itself is ascribed to the instigation of the Devil: "By the envy of the Devil, death came into the world" (Wisdom 2:24).
Yet it is remarkable that for an account of the fall of the angels we must turn to the last book of the Bible.
For as such we may regard the vision in the Apocalypse, albeit the picture of the past is blended with prophecies of what shall be in the future: "And there was a great battle in heaven, Michael and his angels fought with the dragon, and the dragon fought and his angels: and they prevailed not, neither was their place found any more in heaven.
And that great dragon was cast out, that old serpent, who is called the devil and Satan, who seduceth the whole world; and he was cast unto the earth, and his angels were thrown down with him" (Apocalypse 12:7-9).
To this may be added the words of St. Jude: "And the angels who kept not their principality, but forsook their own habitation, he hath reserved under darkness in everlasting chains, unto the judgment of the great day" (Jude 1:6; cf.
II Peter 2:4).
In the Old Testament we have a brief reference to the Fall in Job 4:18: "In his angels he found wickedness".
But to this must be added the two classic texts in the prophets: "How art thou fallen from heaven, O Lucifer, who didst rise in the morning?
how art thou fallen to the earth, that didst wound the nations?
And thou saidst in thy heart: I will ascend into heaven, I will exalt my throne above the stars of God, I will sit in the mountain of the covenant, in the sides of the north.
I will ascend above the height of the clouds, I will be like the most High.
But yet thou shalt be brought down to hell, into the depth of the pit" (Isaiah 14:12-15).
This parable of the prophet is expressly directed against the King of Babylon, but both the early Fathers and later Catholic commentators agree in understanding it as applying with deeper significance to the fall of the rebel angel.
And the older commentators generally consider that this interpretation is confirmed by the words of Our Lord to his disciples: "I saw Satan like lightning falling from heaven" (Luke 10:18).
For these words were regarded as a rebuke to the disciples, who were thus warned of the danger of pride by being reminded of the fall of Lucifer.
But modern commentators take this text in a different sense, and refer it not to the original fall of Satan, but his overthrow by the faith of the disciples, who cast out devils in the name of their Master.
And this new interpretation, as Schanz observes, is more in keeping with the context.
The parallel prophetic passage is Ezekiel's lamentation upon the king of Tyre:
You were the seal of resemblance, full of wisdom, and perfect in beauty.
You were in the pleasures of the paradise of God; every precious stone was thy covering; the sardius, the topaz, and the jasper, the chrysolite, and the onyx, and the beryl, the sapphire, and the carbuncle, and the emerald; gold the work of your beauty: and your pipes were prepared in the day that you were created.
You a cherub stretched out, and protecting, and I set you in the holy mountain of God, you have walked in the midst of the stones of fire.
You were perfect in your wave from the day of creation, until iniquity was found in you.
(Ezekiel 28:12-15)
There is much in the context that can only be understood literally of an earthly king concerning whom the words are professedly spoken, but it is clear that in any case the king is likened to an angel in Paradise who is ruined by his own iniquity.
Even for those who in no way doubt or dispute it, the doctrine set forth in these texts and patristic interpretations may well suggest a multitude of questions, and theologians have not been loath to ask and answer them.
And in the first place what was the nature of the sin of the rebel angels?
In any case this was a point presenting considerable difficulty, especially for theologians, who had formed a high estimate of the powers and possibilities of angelic knowledge, a subject which had a peculiar attraction for many of the great masters of scholastic speculation.
For if sin be, as it surely is, the height of folly, the choice of darkness for light, of evil for good, it would seem that it can only be accounted for by some ignorance, or inadvertence, or weakness, or the influence of some overmastering passion.
But most of these explanations seem to be precluded by the powers and perfections of the angelic nature.
The weakness of the flesh, which accounts for such a mass of human wickedness, was altogether absent from the angels.
There could be no place for carnal sin without the corpus delicti.
And even some sins that are purely spiritual or intellectual seem to present an almost insuperable difficulty in the case of the angels.
This may certainly be said of the sin which by many of the best authorities is regarded as being actually the great offense of Lucifer, to wit, the desire of independence of God and equality with God.
It is true that this seems to be asserted in the passage of Isaiah (14:13).
And it is naturally suggested by the idea of rebellion against an earthly sovereign, wherein the chief of the rebels very commonly covets the kingly throne.
At the same time the high rank which Lucifer is generally supposed to have held in the hierarchy of angels might seem to make this offense more likely in his case, for, as history shows, it is the subject who stands nearest the throne who is most open to temptations of ambition.
But this analogy is not a little misleading.
For the exaltation of the subject may bring his power so near that of his sovereign that he may well be able to assert his independence or to usurp the throne; and even where this is not actually the case he may at any rate contemplate the possibility of a successful rebellion.
Moreover, the powers and dignities of an earthly prince may be compatible with much ignorance and folly.
But it is obviously otherwise in the case of the angels.
For, whatever gifts and powers may be conferred on the highest of the heavenly princes, he will still be removed by an infinite distance from the plenitude of God's power and majesty, so that a successful rebellion against that power or any equality with that majesty would be an absolute impossibility.
And what is more, the highest of the angels, by reason of their greater intellectual illumination, must have the clearest knowledge of this utter impossibility of attaining to equality with God.
This difficulty is clearly put by the Disciple in St. Anselm's dialogue "De Casu Diaboli" (cap.
iv); for the saint felt that the angelic intellect, at any rate, must see the force of the "ontological argument" (see ONTOLOGY).
"If", he asks, "God cannot be thought of except as sole, and as of such an essence that nothing can be thought of like to Him [then] how could the Devil have wished for what could not be thought of?--He surely was not so dull of understanding as to be ignorant of the inconceivability of any other entity like to God" (Si Deus cogitari non potest, nisi ita solus, ut nihil illi simile cogitari possit, quomodo diabolus potuit velle quod non potuit cogitari?
Non enim ita obtusæ mentis erat, ut nihil aliud simile Deo cogitari posse nesciret).
The Devil, that is to say, was not so obtuse as not to know that it was impossible to conceive of anything like (i.e.
equal) to God.
And what he could not think he could not will.
St. Anselm's answer is that there need be no question of absolute equality; yet to will anything against the Divine will is to seek to have that independence which belongs to God alone, and in this respect to be equal to God.
In the same sense St. Thomas (I:63:3) answers the question, whether the Devil desired to be "as God".
If by this we mean equality with God, then the Devil could not desire it, since he knew this to be impossible, and he was not blinded by passion or evil habit so as to choose that which is impossible, as may happen with men.
And even if it were possible for a creature to become God, an angel could not desire this, since, by becoming equal with God he would cease to be an angel, and no creature can desire its own destruction or an essential change in its being.
These arguments are combated by Scotus (In II lib.
Sent., dist.
vi, Q. i.), who distinguishes between efficacious volition and the volition of complaisance, and maintains that by the latter act an angel could desire that which is impossible.
In the same way he urges that, though a creature cannot directly will its own destruction, it can do this consequenter, i.e. it can will something from which this would follow.
Although St. Thomas regards the desire of equality with God as something impossible, he teaches nevertheless (loc.
cit.) that Satan sinned by desiring to be "as God", according to the passage in the prophet (Isaiah 14), and he understands this to mean likeness, not equality.
But here again there is need of a distinction.
For men and angels have a certain likeness to God in their natural perfections, which are but a reflection of his surpassing beauty, and yet a further likeness is given them by supernatural grace and glory.
Was it either of these likenesses that the devil desired?
And if it be so, how could it be a sin?
For was not this the end for which men and angels were created?
Certainly, as Thomas teaches, not every desire of likeness with God would be sinful, since all may rightly desire that manner of likeness which is appointed them by the will of their Creator.
There is sin only where the desire is inordinate, as in seeking something contrary to the Divine will, or in seeking the appointed likeness in a wrong way.
The sin of Satan in this matter may have consisted in desiring to attain supernatural beatitude by his natural powers or, what may seem yet stranger, in seeking his beatitude in the natural perfections and reflecting the supernatural.
In either case, as St. Thomas considers, this first sin of Satan was the sin of pride.
Scotus, however (loc.
cit., Q. ii), teaches that this sin was not pride properly so called, but should rather be described as a species of spiritual lust.
Although nothing definite can be known as to the precise nature of the probation of the angels and the manner in which many of them fell, many theologians have conjectured, with some show of probability, that the mystery of the Divine Incarnation was revealed to them, that they saw that a nature lower than their own was to be hypostatically united to the Person of God the Son, and that all the hierarchy of heaven must bow in adoration before the majesty of the Incarnate Word; and this, it is supposed, was the occasion of the pride of Lucifer (cf.
Suarez, De Angelis, lib.
VII, xiii).
As might be expected, the advocates of this view seek support in certain passages of Scripture, notably in the words of the Psalmist as they are cited in the Epistle to the Hebrews: "And again, when he bringeth in the first-begotten into the world, he saith: And let all the angels of God adore Him" (Hebrews 1:6; Psalm 96:7).
And if the twelfth chapter of the Apocalypse may be taken to refer, at least in a secondary sense, to the original fall of the angels, it may seem somewhat significant that it opens with the vision of the Woman and her Child.
But this interpretation is by no means certain, for the text in Hebrews, i, may be referred to the second coming of Christ, and much the same may be said of the passage in the Apocalypse.
It would seem that this account of the trial of the angels is more in accordance with what is known as the Scotist doctrine on the motives of the Incarnation than with the Thomist view, that the Incarnation was occasioned by the sin of our first parents.
For since the sin itself was committed at the instigation of Satan, it presupposes the fall of the angels.
How, then, could Satan's probation consist in the fore-knowledge of that which would, ex hypothesi, only come to pass in the event of his fall?
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