Eternal Life
aioniuos zoe [John 17:3]
αἰώνιος.
Adj. with 2 and 3endings: “eternal.” Orphic. Hymn., 87, 5 (Abel); Plat. Leg., X, 904a; Resp. II, 363d; Tim., 37d and 38b: θεὸν τὸν αἰώνιον, Tim. Locr., 96c. In later poetry and prose αἰώνιος is also used in the sense of “lifelong” or “enduring,” in accordance with the basic meaning of → αἰών: Callim. Hymn., 3, 6; 4, 130; Philodem. De Deis, III, 8, 22, Diels (AAB, 1916, 4); Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom., X, 36; Diod. S., I, 1, 5; IV, 63, 4; Max. Tyr., XLIII, 43, Dübner.1 Cf. the distinction between νοῦσος χρονίη and αἰωνίη in Aretaios of Cappadocia (181, 7 Ermerins). Inscriptions: ἡ αἰώνιος καὶ ἀθάνατος τοῦ παντὸς φύσις, Inscr. Brit. Mus. (inscription in honour of Augustus from Halicarnass.); εἰς χρόνον αἰώνιον, Ditt. Or., 383, 11; πρὸς δόξαν καὶ μνήμην αἰώνιον, ibid., 438, 13 and many similar formulations.3 In the later empire αἰώνιος (aeternus) is applied to the emperors like many similar divine predicates, e.g., τῶν αἰωνίων Αὐγούστων, ibid., 580, 3; 619, 2; 722, 6.
In the LXX עוֹלָם is often rendered adjectivally by αἰώνιος, the sense being thus affected, e.g., in ψ 23:7: πύλαι αἰώνιοι (“everlasting doors”) instead of “ancient doors”;
Ζ
ζάω, ζωή (βιόω, βίος), ἀναζάω, ζῷον, ζωογονέω, ζωοποιέω
ζάω, ζωή (βιόω, βίος) (→ θάνατος).
A. ζωή in Greek Usage.
1. Classical Usage.
a. ζωή (ζῆν) denotes in Greek the physical vitality of organic beings, animals, men and also plants.2 Life is understood, not as a thing, but as vitality, as the nature or manner which characterises all living creatures as such. Hence ζωή cannot be used in the plur. ζωή is expressed in the fact that living creatures rise up and move and have their distinctive ἔργον. Figuratively, therefore, one may speak of the life of, e.g., valid νόμιμα (Soph. Ant., 457), and Plato can describe as a ζῶντα καὶ ἔμψυχον the λόγος τοῦ εἰδότος which is efficacious (Phaedr., 276a).4 The whole κόσμος as ἔμψυχος can be called a ζῷον. Aristot. in An., II, 2, p. 413a, 22 ff. says that we can speak of ζῆν where there are νοῦς, αἴσθησις, κίνησις καὶ στάσις ἡ κατὰ τόπον, ἔτι κίνησις ἡ κατὰ τροφήν καὶ φθίσις τε καὶ αὔξησις, or where one of these δυνάμεις is present. ζωή is most commonly defined as movement in the broadest sense, i.e., not merely as spatial movement but also as ἀλλοίωσις. It is self-movement as distinct from mechanical movement.
It thus belongs to physics, and, in so far as this seeks causes, the cause of ζωή is found in the → ψυχή. We may accept as ζῷα all beings ὅσσα ψυχὴν ἔχει (Democr. Fr., 278, II, 117, 8 ff., Diels).8 Thus in Plat. Phaedr., 105c ff. the immortality of the soul is maintained in view of the fact that ψυχή and ζωή belong essentially together (cf. Phaedr., 245c ff.; Soph;, 248e ff.). According to Aristot. An., II, 1, p. 412a, 27 ff. the ψυχή is the ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος or σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ (cf. p. 412a, 19 ff.; p. 413a, 20 ff.). It is in keeping that in true Gk. thought, and expressly in Aristot., only σώματα can be regarded as living, since the ψυχή exists only in the σῶμα (An., II, 1, p. 412b, 7 ff.; p. 413a, 3 ff.). Even human ζωή is understood as a natural phenomenon. It does not differ from that of plants and animals by the mere fact that it is my individual life. Death, too, is regarded as a natural phenomenon. It is the antithesis of life (e.g., Plat. Phaed., 71d, 105c ff.) and yet it also belongs to it as its natural end.
ζωή can also be posited of the godhead to the extent that the gods, which are regarded as ἀθάνατοι both in philosophy and in popular superstition, are still classified as ζῷα having a σῶμα and ψυχή, the only point being that this σύστασις is never dissolved. Thus Plato distinguishes between ἀθάνατα and θνητὰ ζῷα (Phaedr., 246d ff.; Tim., 38c ff.). Of course, the gods which are accepted as ἀθάνατοι (the constellations) are not supreme being or supreme deity. Their immortality is simply unending duration in time, whereas non-temporal eternity is ascribed to supreme deity, so that ζωή cannot properly be assigned to it. In Phaed., 106d Plato links together as immortal God and the εἶδος of ζωή (ὁ δέ γε θεός … καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς εἶδος καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἀθάνατόν ἐστιν). For him the cosmos is a ζῷον ἔμψυχον, but it is the son of God and not supreme deity itself (Tim., 30b; 34b, 37c, 92b). On the other hand, in Soph., 248e κίνησις, ζωή, ψυχή and φρόνησις are ascribed to the παντελῶς ὄν as well. For Aristot. the deity is incorporeal and unmoved as πρῶτον κινοῦν, but it is still a ζῷον, its ζωή being eternal. Inasmuch as the deity is pantheistically understood as the total κόσμος, the ζῷον ἔμψυχον, we naturally find the scientific concept of ζωή as the vitality of the whole taking individual shape in the specific phenomena of organic life as they rise and change and fall. Yet in Aristot. the deity stands outside the κόσμος as pure νοῦς. The ἐνέργεια of νοῦς is ζωή, but the ἐνέργεια of the divine νοῦς is ζωή ἀρίστη καὶ ἀΐδιος (Metaph., XI, 7, p. 1072b, 26 ff.).
b. It may be seen from this usage that Greek thought originally understands by ζωή something rather more than and other than what is expressed by the scientific term ζωή with its fundamentally similar reference to man, animals and plants. If the ζωή of the deity is described as νοεῖν, as θεωρία, and characterised as ἀρίστη, as μακαριότης, then ζωή is defined in terms of what man himself regards as his supreme and characteristic possibility, namely, θεωρία. To the degree that νοεῖν or θεωρεῖν is understood only as a δύναμις present in a natural phenomenon, like αἴσθησις and κίνησις (Aristot. An., II, p. 413a, 23 ff.), it can still be regarded as an expression of ζωή as itself a natural phenomenon. But in fact the understanding of νοῦς goes beyond this. It can be described as something different from vital ζωή which has come into the soul θύραθεν (Gen. An., II, 736b, 27 f.; 744b, 21) and which is the divine in man.13 If life in the νοῦς, θεωρία, is really man’s supreme possibility, and if this θεωρία can never be fulfilled in man except in the greatest separation from the σῶμα, though not apart from it, this means that fundamentally true human ζωή is not the ζωή in virtue of which a being becomes a ζῷον by the unity of σῶμα and ψυχή. In the Greek concept of ζωή there are thus two motifs, as in the concept of ψυχή. On the one side ψυχή is the principle of vital life in matter, and on the other it is the specifically human principle of self-awareness, so that in one trend in Greek philosophy ψυχή can be dualistically opposed to → σῶμα as an eternal and pre-existent stranger within it. Similarly, ζωή is not merely life as a natural phenomenon but also specifically human life which man does not enjoy merely in virtue of the fact that he is a ζῷον.
No clear linguistic distinction is made at this point. Yet it is obvious that specifically human life must be differentiated from natural ζωή. Nor is this a mere question of the differentiation of ζωή in the ζῷα, since not all organisms are equally rich and complicated. Human life is specifically distinct from all other in virtue of the fact that its possibilities are not fulfilled in factuality like those of organic nature. An indication of this is the fact that man’s life can be a life for something, whereas the meaning of natural life is simply the continuation of the individual ζῷον or species. Above all, man’s life is not a state but a being in unfulfilled or only partially fulfilled possibilities, while the life of deity is always fulfilled. In the case of man what matters is his true life, and usually this is not identical with his factual life. This may be seen in the fact that Homer calls the gods ῥεῖα (effortlessly) ζώοντες (Il., 6, 138) and distinguishes heroes from men οἷοι νῦν βροτοί εἰσιν. It may also be seen in the fact that human life can be characterised as ἀγαθή (Plat. Resp., 521a), ἀρίστη (Aristot. Metaph., XI, 7, p. 1072b, 28), μακαρία (Plat. Leg., IV, 713c), λυσιτελεστάτη (Plat. Resp., 344e), or αἰσχρά (Plat. Leg., XII, 944c). It may be seen above all in adverbial phrases like εὖ ζῆν, ζῆν κάλλιον καὶ ὀρθότερον (Plat. Menex., 248d), ἄριστα ζῆν (ibid., 248a, cf. Gorg., 512e), κοσμίως ζῆν, κατὰ λόγον ζῆν (Plat. Leg., III, 689d). From this we may gather that human life is more than a natural process of τροφή, αὔξησις and φθίσις (→ 833). It includes an individual and appropriate fate in terms of which it may be regarded as happy or unhappy. Above all it knows its possibilities and thus stands under the question of what is proper to it (the εὖ), whether it is true or perverted. As one may speak of ζῆν κατὰ λόγον, so it may be said that one understands how to live; Xenoph. Mem., III, 3, 11: ἢ οὐκ ἐντεθύμησαι, ὅτι, ὅσα τε νόμῳ μεμαθήκαμεν κάλλιστα ὄντα, διʼ ὧν γε ζῆν ἐπιστάμεθα, ταῦτα πάντα διὰ λόγου ἐμάθομεν; Doubt may also arise whether the life we live really deserves the name:
τίς οἶδεν, εἰ τὸ ζῆν μέν ἐστι κατθανεῖν,
τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν κάτω νομίζεται (Eur. Fr. [TGF] → θάνατος).
c. This conception is finally facilitated by the co-existence of βίος (βιοῦν) along with ζωή (ζῆν). Factual human life always takes shape in an individual βίος in which it may succeed or fail, and the question arises in what βίος human ζωή is truly manifested. βίος denotes manner of life or character, and it is closely related to ἦθος. βίος can also be used of animals or the gods (Plat. Phaedr., 247e), but here the reference is to species, whereas the βίοι of men (the plur. can be used) are their individual forms of life, though always on the specific Greek presupposition that there are only limited possibilities of βίος and that in a true βιός the βίος of the human species is purely expressed. Hence βίος can also become a technical term for the writing of a life (biography). As the individual life, βίος can also mean the time or duration of life. One may speak of βίον ζῆν. Thus ζῆν and βιοῦν can be used synonymously, but also ζωή and βίος. In the sense of leading one’s life βίος can also be used in the external sense for calling, trade or even means of support or means, though the reference is to the individual life which is implicated in choice29 and which stands under the question of its true nature as expressed in the question of the βίος βιωτός, of the → σωτηρία τοῦ βίου (Plat. Prot., 356d e), of the τέλειος βίος. The question is answered, e.g., in statements that βίος is worth living only in the πόλις. For this reason νόμος rules the βίος of men (Democr. Fr., 248 [II, 110, 3 ff., Diels]; Plat. Leg., II, 663a; VII, 803a), and education is needed: πᾶς γὰρ ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εὐρυθμίας τε καὶ εὐαρμοστίας δεῖται (Plat. Prot., 326b). He who is without the τροφὴ παιδεύσεως: χωλὴν τοῦ βίου διαπορευθεὶς ζωὴν ἀτελὴς καὶ ἀνόητος εἰσἍιδου πάλιν ἔρχεται (Plat. Tim., 44c). According to idealistic philosophy, life is truly fulfilled as life in the νοῦς, in θεωρία, as the life of the philosopher. If Plat. Phileb., 22a distinguishes τρεῖς βίοι as the basic possibilities given to men, so from the time of Aristot. (Eth. Nic., I, 3, p. 1095b, 14 ff.) there is a customary threefold division of βίοι into the ἀπολαυστικός, πρακτικός (πολιτικός) and θεωρητικός. The third is the highest, for it is divine (Aristot. Eth. Nic., X, 8, p. 1178b, 20 ff.; Metaph., XI, 9, p. 1074b, 25 f.).
If, then, it belongs to the ζωή of man that it is a βίος, human life is always regarded as mine. Yet this thought is not carried through radically. The various βίος are not regarded as unique and unrepeatable; they are classified and graded in self-repeating types. A leading question is that of the normal βίος. It is not the historical moment, or the claim of the Thou addressed to man in it, which gives man the possibility of true being. What he has to actualise in his individual existence is the supratemporal and general, whether as the νόμος of the πόλις or as the λόγος. This is the basis of the Greek view of education. Nevertheless, both as a natural phenomenon and as a (Platonic) ἀληθῶς ζῆν realised in the individual βίος, ζωή belongs to this world. As natural vitality it certainly transcends the individual, but it does not belong to the other world in the religious sense; and as the ζωή which is fulfilled in the individual life as τέλειος βίος it is a human possibility which is not eschatological except perhaps that the μακαρία ζωή is constantly achieved only in the godhead and only intermittently by us (Aristot. → n. 17), since our φύσις is not ἁπλῆ and is thus subiect to μεταβολή (Aristot. Eth. Nic., VII, 15, p. 1154b, 21 ff.).
2. Hellenistic Usage.
a. Stoicism. Stoicism is controlled by the ζωή concept of scientific tradition. ζωή, understood as κίνησις in the broadest sense, is physical life expressed in all organic creatures.
In contrast to Arist. the whole κόσμος is regarded as a unity of the psycho-physical organism, so that the distinction between the ζῷα which have a ψυχή and the λίθοι and ξύλα is relativised (v. Arnim, III, 90, 12 ff.); and the κόσμος as ζῷον ἔμψυχον is regarded as identical with deity (ibid., II, 191, 34 ff.; 305, 15 ff.). Man is thus a part of the κόσμος, a cosmic phenomenon. His birth is a μεταβολὴ τοῦ πνεύματος εἰς ζωήν. In him the general vital force of the κόσμος, the πνεῦμα, takes individualised form. As life is a natural phenomenon, so is death (→ θάνατος).
It is quite evident, however, that the actual fulfilment of life is not a natural process, that the κατὰ φύσιν or ὁμολογουμένως or ἀκολούθως τῇ φύσει ζῆν (cf. v. Arnim, Index) is not achieved of itself, but has to be undertaken and realised by an intelligent resolve.
κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν is equivalent to εὖ ζῆν, κατὰ λόγον or κατʼ ἀρετὴν ζῆν (v. Arnim, Index). One may thus speak of a βιωτική (sc. τέχνη) (M. Ant., VII, 61). Man must be reminded that he is not just a ζῷον but primarily an ἄνθρωπος; just as Epict. speaks of the ἐξαίρετον which makes man truly man (Diss., III, 1, 25 f.; IV, 11, 3, 27), so M. Ant. speaks of the ἄνθρωπος, καθὸ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν (V, 15; IX, 2). If man’s ζῆν κατὰ φύσιν is realised only in the ζῆν κατὰ λόγον, it is plain that here again life is seen to stand under the question whether it is true life or not. In Stoic parlance, it stands under the question of its τέλος or its σωτηρία. A man who does not achieve true humanity is described as “dead.” In contrast to this true life,41 natural ζωή is an ἀδιάφορον which has relative value in the fact that its presence is the presupposition for the attainment of the ideal of virtue. True life does not belong to the other world. It is attained in the χρῆσις οἵα δεῖ φαντασιῶν under the direction of the free ἡγεμονικόν. Its attainment is ἐφʼ ἡμῖν.
ζωὴ κατὰ φύσιν can also be called βίος κατὰ φύσιν (v. Arnim, III, 16, 28 f.), and the life of λογικὰ ζῷα can be distinguished from the life of ἄλογα as βίος. The question of the ὀρθὸς βίος is a live one (v. Arnim, I, 86, 27), and in varying dependence on Aristot. three βίοι are distinguished (ibid., III, 173, 4 f., v. Index). The less importance the πόλις comes to have for the sage, the more the normal βίος of the sage becomes a schematic picture for the Stoic. Attainment is achieved in the contemplation and nurture of the inner life with the goal of making oneself independent of the world and destiny in ἀπέχεσθαι and ἀνέχεσθαι, of reducing the significance of the concrete moment to the general requirement of inner freedom, and of thus annihilating it. Nevertheless, it may be seen, e.g., from M. Ant., that the dogma does not necessarily blind to the claim of the moment (→ θάνατος).
b. Neo-Platonism. Along with the new influences of oriental dualism, the tradition of anthropological dualism (→ 834), which in Plato had been made to serve an idealistic conception of soul and body, again asserted itself in Neo-Platonism, though not at the price of the idealistic concept of ζωή.
On the one side Plotinus maintains the scientific view of ζωή. ζωή belongs essentially to ψυχή, which pervades the κόσμος as a ζῷον ἔμψυχον and distributes itself in the individual souls indwelling σώματα. Yet through this monistic conception runs a dualistic, as may be seen in the fact that for all his polemic against Gnosticism Plot. regards the human ψυχή as a stranger in the σῶμα. It has come down from above and is to seek again its heavenly home by aversion from the earthly. Thus the individual soul survives death (the migration of souls). Hence a tension arises in the understanding of ζωή. ζωή and ψυχή derive from the νοῦς, which is true being. Above this, beyond the νοῦς and οὐσία, is the ἕν, which has no ζωή but is ζωῆς αἴτιον and πηγὴ ζωῆς. To the degree that Plot. views the world and man from the standpoint of descent or emanation, he sets himself in opposition to the Gk. view of ζωή, since ζωή always occupies a lower rung on the ladder of totality, so that Plot. can use the plur. ζωαί. True ζωή belongs to the νοερὰ φύσις; cf. Enn., I, 4, 3 (p. 66, 26 ff.): ὅτι δʼ ἡ τελεία ζωὴ καὶ ἡ ἀληθινὴ καὶ ὄντως ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ νοερᾷ φύσει, καὶ ὅτι αἱ ἄλλαι ἀτελεῖς καὶ ἰνδάλματα ζωῆς καὶ οὐ τελείως οὐδὲ καθαρῶς καὶ οὐ μᾶλλον ζωαὶ ἢ τοὐναντίον. It is particularly clear, however, that if man is seen from the standpoint of a return from the earthly and ἐπιστροφή to the νοῦς, true life is not a natural process, but has to be attained by man. True being is not given to the ψυχή, but set as a task. Man has true ζωή, not ἐνεργείᾳ, but δυνάμει. Over against his natural ζῆν, ᾧ θάνατος μέμικται (Enn., VI, 7, 29 [p. 461, 5]), stands the τελεία ζωή (I, 4, 3 f. [p. 66, 20; 23; 27; and 67, 3; 9]), the ἀληθινὴ ζωή (I, 4, 3 [p. 66, 27]; VI, 9, 9 [p. 522, 7]), the ἀληθῶς ζῆν. The way to this is by turning from the σῶμα, χωρισμός, κάθαρσις. This is grasped in contemplation, in which man becomes οὐσία καὶ νοῦς καὶ ζῷον παντελές (VI, 7, 36 [p. 470, 1]), in which he not only has but is ζωή. In θέα man stands in purely passive relation to the ἕν, being fashioned by it and becoming one with it (VI, 7, 31 [p. 463, 21 ff.]): ἔνθα δὴ εἶδε μὲν [the ψυχή] καλὰ πάντα καὶ ἀληθῆ ὄντα, καὶ ἐπερρώσθη πλέον τῆς τοῦ ὄντος ζωῆς πληρωθεῖσα, καὶ ὄντως ὂν καὶ αὐτὴ γενομένη. This ἀληθινὴ ζωή can be described as belonging to the other world, and Plot. calls it an ἄλλη ζωή (VI, 9, 9 [p. 522, 4]). The way to it is, of course, philosophy (VI, 9, 3), though it no longer rests on πολιτικαὶ ἀρεταὶ but on μείζονες (I, 2; 3–7), and such a man no longer lives the βίος of an ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος, but the βίος τῶν θεῶν. If, then, the ἀληθινὴ ζωή is no longer accomplished in the historicity of human existence but interrupts history as the moment of vision and thus reduces history to a mere theatre (III, 2, 15), yet in contrast to Gnosticism Plot. seeks to understand true ζωή as a determination of actual man to the degree that his life is a constant striving for the ἀγαθόν under the control of ἔρως, so that the illusion of possession is a sign of non-possession (II, 9, 9 [p. 195, 20 ff.]).
c. Gnosticism. In Plot. true divine life is always characterised by attributes like ἀληθινή. In Gnosticism, however, ζωή without attribute denotes the divine life. Again, in Plot., for all the inconsistency, there is a linguistic connection with Greek tradition inasmuch as he distinguishes true life from natural vitality as the specific life of man which is consciously grasped and achieved in spiritual processes. But this connection is abandoned in Gnosticism. In the context of Gnostic dualism life belongs definitely to the divine side. But this means that life has lost the sense of strictly human life. It is understood as a physical phenomenon, yet not as the vitality of cosmic being, but as indestructible duration and also as the underlying force which triumphs over all obstacles. ζωή is regarded as something which is already present in the divine world. It flows down from this world like a mysterious fluid. It can be present as a “something” in man and things (→ δύναμις). Its true bearer is no longer the ψυχή as natural vitality, but the πνεῦμα, the divine breath of life.59
Behind this lies a primitive view of vital force which the Greek world had long since outgrown but which revives in Hellenism under alien influences, esp. Egyptian.60 In Egypt life is the divine fluid which flows down from the Godhead on earthly beings and gives them life. The supposedly divine king receives from the Godhead life which is indestructible and which fills him like a fluid.
If this idea is adopted in Gk. Hellenistic writings, it is not primarily in the context of a systematically dualistic philosophy. ζωή is understood as the divine vitality which rules in every living thing and which is sought for man in prayer and wish and esp. in magic.62 Above all man seeks the φάρμακον τῆς ζωῆς which guarantees immortality and which is assured in the mysteries.
In Gnostic dualism life is regarded as an absolutely otherworldly divine power or as the ἀφθαρσία established by it, so that this ζωή cannot be received in the earthly world and its apparent life.
Cf. Valentinus in Cl. Al. Strom., IV, 13, 89, 6: ὁπόσον ἐλάττων ἡ εἰκὼν τοῦ ζῶντος προσώπου, τοσοῦτον ἥσσων ὁ κόσμος τοῦ ζῶντος αἰῶνος (i.e., of God). Among the Mandaeans God is always called the “life” (distinguished as the first, second and third life), and in contrast to the world this is spoken of as an “alien” or “hidden” life. “Living” or “… of life” is used to denote relationship to the divine world (e.g., messenger, emissary, word, call, way, scent, treasure, water, garment, planting, stem or fruits of life). Acc. to the strata of Gnostic piety the divine power of ζωή is regarded quite materialistically as a something which flows into the believer or there is striving to experience ζωή in the manner of life. Both are reflected in the common combination of ζωή with φῶς. → φῶς, too, denotes the power of the divine world, cf. Hipp. Ref., IV, 43, p. 66, 27: προσῳκείωται … τῷ μὲν φωτὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἡ ζωή (cf. IV, 44, p. 67, 12). The mystery formula of the Marcosites invokes God as τὸν φῶς ὀνομαζόμενον καὶ πνεῦμα ἀγαθὸν καὶ ζωή (Iren., I, 21, 3). In the Teaching of Queen Cleopatra ζωή and φῶς denote the divine being. As “light” and “life” are used for salvation in the Od. Sol. (cf. “immortality” in 8:23; 9:4; 15:8; 40:6 etc.), so in the Coptic Gnostic writings God is light and life (Griech. Christl. Schriftsteller, VIII, 1 [1905], 344, 12; 352, 32; 361, 16 f., C. Schmidt), and what He gives is light or life or the light of life (ibid, p. 103, 10 ff.; 258, 28 ff.). In the Mandaeans light is regularly used for God along with life. This combination is particularly characteristic of one group of Hermetic writings. As Ptolemaios in Epiph. Haer., 33, 7, 7 defines the οὐσία of God as ἀφθαρσία τε καὶ φῶς αὐτὸ ὄν, ἁπλοῦν τε καὶ μονοειδὲς, so in Corp. Herm., I, 12 the πάντων πατήρ is called ζωὴ καὶ φῶς. ζωή and φῶς may also be used of the being of true man, i.e., of the original man, who fell into matter and whose divine being intermingled with φύσις, so that man is now διπλοῦς, namely, θνητὸς μὲν διὰ τὸ σῶμα, ἀθάνατος δὲ διὰ τὸν οὐσιώδη ἄνθρωπον (Corp. Herm., I, 15, cf. Scott., I, p. 296. 28 ff.; 300, 10 ff. and Fr., 15, ibid., p. 538). In this common combination (Corp. Herm., I, 9, 12, 17, 21, 32; XIII, 9 and 18 f.) it may be seen that ζωή does not imply mere duration but more particularly the vital force which effects this. That it is understood physically even though it is divine may be seen from the differentiation between ζωή as the power of ψυχή and ζωή as the power of νοῦς (ibid., I, 17); yet here ψυχή is regarded as divine rather than earthly or natural vitality (as μετέχουσα τῆς τοῦ δημιουργικοῦ δυνάμεως, Fr. 16, Scott., I, p. 538).70 As a thing rather than a manner of life like βίος, ζωή is contained in man. But it is hampered by the σῶμα, so that man must be taught concerning his true being by revelation in order to liberate himself from the σῶμα and to return to ζωή and φῶς (Corp. Herm., I, 21 and 32). The ἕνωσις of the inner and true man with God implies ζωή for him (I, 6). It is also clear that this is understood as a thing, as a divine vitality, as physical force, for the ascent to God can be called the new birth (→ παλιγγενεσία, I, 687) which gives an ἀθάνατον σῶμα (XIII, 3), and this new birth can be described as endowment with divine δυνάμεις, with the last of which, ἀλήθεια (→ I, 240), ζωή and φῶς are associated (XIII, 9, cf. 12). The ἕνωσις thereby attained is indicated by the fact that the divine powers in the regenerate praise God: … ζωὴ καὶ φῶς, ἀφʼ ὑμῶν εἰς ὑμᾶς χωρεῖ ἡ εὐλογία (XIII, 18), and the regenerate prays: τὸ πᾶν τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν σῶζε ζωή, φώτιζε φῶς (XIII, 19). Cf. also the concluding prayer of the λόγος τέλειος: ἐγνωρίσαμέν σε, ὦ <τῆς> ἀνθρωπίνης ζωῆς.
If ζωή is a physical phenomenon which can simply be called → ἀθανασία (Corp. Herm., I, 28), there is naturally a good deal more in the term, as may be seen from the fact that this ζωή can already be experienced in ecstatic vision and that it can be described as a state of blessedness in which the redeemed sees God and praises him in the dance of heavenly δυνάμεις. In fact, therefore, ζωή is experienced as a definite physical state, and yet it is also awaited in the future. It must be described as otherworldly and eschatological inasmuch as man, even though he has it within him in terms of speculation concerning the first man, does not really have it and cannot truly conceive of it as he now is, but must attain to it through a new self-understanding given by divine revelation, through relapsing into contemplation (→ γνῶσις) and through an ascetic manner of life.
It thus appears that the term ζωή implies a concept of true life hereafter which must have the character of individuality and which already has this to the degree that ζωή includes a definite self-understanding and experience. But since man is severed from his historical particularity when the true man is loosed from the σῶμα through which he first receives the concrete possibilities of historical life, freedom from death really means freedom from the specific possibilities of human existence; when guided by the myth of the first man, the self-understanding of man as knowledge of his whence and whither loses the sense of knowledge of my whence and whither and becomes mere general speculation. Inasmuch as it is thought of non-historically, ζωή can in fact be regarded only as physical vitality; and to the degree that this ζωή is always my ζωή it can be regarded only as a psychical state. Negatively, this means that its actualisation can be achieved at root only in negations.
There is more than this in the Od. Sol., in which life has also the sense of incorruptibility (11:12; cf. 8:23; 15:8; 22:10 f.; 40:6). But here life and light are actual in the revelation given in the word (10:1; 12:7; 32:1f.) by which man understands himself both in creation and redemption (6:18; 7:12; 13:1f.). Thus life in the concrete existence of the believer is fulfilled as the knowledge of God (8:10–12), as joy (15:1f. etc.) and as love (8:13; 40:4; 41:6).
Bultmann
B. Life and Death in the OT.
The views of life and death recorded in the writings of the OT are naturally related to general oriental conceptions. Indeed, at many points they are directly dependent on ideas which arose in the great cultural centres and which went out from these to surrounding territories as developed conceptions. It is true, of course, that faith in Yahweh had resources which enabled it to refashion what was adopted, to give to it new emphases and to subject it to its own specific heritage. Our task, however, is not simply to bring out the differences in a process of subtraction. It is rather to discuss the distinctive OT findings in relation to the familiarity of Israelite thinking with common oriental conceptions. Only thus can theology arrive at the required understanding of the relevant statements.
1. Life in the OT.
The OT חַיִּים does not cover all that we mean by life. It indicates only physical, organic life, and this for the most part as the epitome of the interrelated forces and phenomena.77 Yet for the Hebrews the term implies far more than objective assertion of a natural fact. It also includes an emphatic value judgment. It is not merely that life is the initial presupposition of all goods and all striving. The possession of life is throughout the OT an intrinsic good which cannot be relativised. It is indeed the supreme good. Wisdom offers riches and honour in the left hand, but long life in the right (
