African Jewish Customs.2288
AFRICAN JEWISH CUSTOMS - PARALLEL
Ref. 2288
BIBLE READING: Deuteronomy 21:10-14
Labola - Roora - Bride Price
As is the case in many African societies, the normative marriage customs of the Shona-speaking peoples are characterized by the negotiation and payment of bride-wealth. In Shona society, the payment of this bride-wealth, the main part of which is called roora, is the basis of marriage and family obligations. Despite the continuing emphasis on roora payments in the ethnographic literature, it is clear that several types of unions exist that deviate from the normative roora marriage. Ethnographic studies suggest that these "deviant" types of union are becoming increasingly common, but little is known about their prevalence, and about the specific changes in marriage practices that are taking place. In this study I will strive to document and clarify the transformations of Shona marriage customs noted in ethnographic studies.
The gradual erosion of traditional marriage customs in favour of more informal types of unions has been observed in many African societies, especially among the better' educated and urban segments of the population. Most theories attribute this decline in the prevalence of formal marriages to the gradual breakdown of the influence of the lineage and to changes in the relative status of men and women that result from socio-economic transformations. In societies where bride-wealth is high, there is a tendency to value premarital virginity and males (in particular fathers and brothers) have an interest in controlling the marriage patterns of women (Obbo 1980:51). These goals can be achieved by arranging marriages for girls, and by restricting contact between persons of the opposite sex before marriage. But strict parental control can sometimes be avoided by means of elopements, which may be followed by marriages contracted without parental consent (Goody 1976:14-17).
Resentment of the traditional subordination of women to their husbands is often cited as another reason for the decline in bride-wealth marriages. In traditional bride-wealth marriages, husbands have authority; husbands expect their wives to be obedient, and they tend to make claims on their wives' labour and income (Bledsoe 1 990; Little 1973:38; Obbo 1980; Roberts 1988). Nowadays, women who are educated or who are engaged in wage labor often challenge their husband's authority and want a greater influence in decision-making. In many cases, husbands oppose their wives' involvement in wage labour because they believe that women who have an independent source of income may become "big headed" and uncontrollable, a situation which is believed to lead to divorce. Hence, women's desire to gain status through economic independence is often a source of conflict within the union. In an attempt to avoid such conflicts a growing group of women now try to escape male control by steering clear from bride-wealth marriages (Bledsoe 1980; Goody 1990: 1 31; MacGaffey 1988:172; Obbo 1980:44, 153; Oppong 1980; Parpart 1988:124; Stichter and Parpart 1988). Clearly, this option of avoiding formal marriage is only open to those women who have sufficient resources outside of marriage. Thus, the tendency to avoid marriage is particularly visible among professional, better educated, urban, and wealthy women. Rather than contracting a formal marriage, these women prefer unmarried cohabitation or prefer to have lovers who do not live with them because this allows them to maintain their liberty. Should such a partner attempt to curtail the woman's autonomy, then she can leave him without the complications that normally arise in cases where bride-wealth needs to be returned (Oppong 1980:202).
Despite the fact that some women prefer to remain single, marriage remains an important indicator of female status, and many women believe that an unsatisfactory marriage (or a brief one) is preferable to not being married at all (Little 1973:29; Obbo 1980:106). Consequently, resentments of the institution of marriage (or of male domination) frequently result not in outright rejection of married life, but rather in a postponement of marriage; for example, until the woman has completed her education or until she has accumulated a certain amount of wealth of her own. Alternatively, women can gain social status but minimize control by parents and husbands by entering into new forms of unions (e.g., marriages with low bride-wealth). These changes in marriage patterns are taking place among the Shona.
The Shona are known to practice several forms of unions that deviate from the normative roora (bride-wealth) marriage. Traditionally, the Shona considered roora as a noble custom that functioned as a safeguard against marital dissolution because it generally needs to be repaid upon divorce (Bere-Chikara 1970:22; May 1983). The payment of roora gave a man custody of the children resulting from the union (i.e., rights in genetricern, see Goody 1973). Normally, a woman's father would not allow her to take up residence with her partner until these bride-wealth payments had started Bourdillon 1987:315; May 1983:25). A system based on bride-wealth payment implies that the family groups have a vested interest in the marriage, and that their influence over the married couple is considerable (May 1983). There is increasing evidence that young couples now attempt to bypass the rigidities of this system.
Young couples increasingly oppose the payment of roora, at least in part because the amount of roora that is commonly demanded by a girl's family has become extremely high (because the bride's father wants to be compensated for investing in the education of his daughter, see May 1983:48). There are strong indications that couples are trying to avoid parental control of the marriage by forming alternative types of unions (e.g., elopements). While inconceivable in the past it now also happens, especially in urban areas, that couples live together without trying to legalize their union by paying roora (Bourdillon 1987; Mittlebeeler 1976). These changes in union formation have important implications for the stability of these unions, the inheritance and property rights by women, and the custody and responsibility for the children resulting from these unions (Maboreke 1987; May 1983; Ncube 1987).
Unfortunately, ethnographic studies of the Shona have not been able to assess the prevalence of these alternative types of unions. While the results of survey research can be generalized to the larger population, it is important to acknowledge that existing large-scale surveys have failed to capture the complexities of the African marriage process. Because bride-wealth payments extend over a long period of time among the Shona as elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, there is often no clear point at which a couple can say that they are fully married whereas they were not so before (Boutdillon 1987:40; May 1983:79-80; Meekers 1992; van de Walle 1968; Ware 1977). Consequently, the interpretation of standard indicators of marriage is dubious, and often results in the omission of unions that are in progress or that deviate from the norm. Commonly used statistical indicators of marriage, such as age at marriage and marital status, are not sufficient to reveal the perhaps subtle but important changes in marriage customs. What is needed in such a situation is a type of survey questionnaire that takes ethnographic information into account by collecting detailed information about all the significant events in the union formation process. Here I use information from a 1986 survey of reproductive union formation in Hatare, Zimbabwe, to get a better understanding of the transformations of Shona marriage practices.
2. Circumcision - Brit
a. Covenant
b. Initiation
3. Zulu Kraal - Tabernacle